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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-Confessions Need Not be Proved Voluntary Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt Prior to Being Admitted into Evidence.
In 1961, Don Richard Lego was convicted of armed robbery after a
jury trial in Cook County, Illinois. He was sentenced to the state penitentiary for a term of twenty-five years.
Included in the evidence introduced against the defendant at the
trial was a confession made to police officers after Lego had been arrested and taken into custody.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to have the confession suppressed
on the grounds that it was not given voluntarily. The trial judge conducted a full hearing, out of the presence of the jury, on the issue of
voluntariness. At the hearing, Lego testified that he gave the confession after being beaten by the police. He introduced a photograph
which had been taken of him after his confession showing his face
swollen and with traces of blood. Four police officers also testified.
They denied that Lego had been beaten or threatened in any manner.
They explained the condition of Lego in the photograph as being the
result of a struggle with the robbery victim. Lego admitted to this
struggle. The trial judge admitted the confession as being voluntarily
made.'
At the trial, Lego testified on his own behalf as to the circumstances
surrounding the taking of the confession. He did not deny making the
confession or even its truth, but argued that he had not given it voluntarily.2 The trial judge instructed the jury as to the state's burden of
proof but gave no instruction that the jury was also required to find the
confession voluntary before it could be used in their determination.
1. In ruling the confession admissible, the trial court concluded: "I donft believe
the defendant's testimony at all that he was beaten up by the Police. The condition
he is in is well explained by the defendant himself."

2.

The defendant also testified, however, that he would have made the statements

even without any claimed police brutality.
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Following conviction, Lego appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court which affirmed the conviction.'
Four years later, Lego sought to challenge his conviction by filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. He claimed that the trial judge
should have found his confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt
before admitting it into evidence.4 In the alternative, he argued that
the voluntariness issue should have been submitted to the jury for a
separate determination. 5 The District Court heard the issue on its
merits, denying any relief;' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on
March 29, 1971.s
In affirming the lower court rulings and in denying the contentions
of the petitioner, the Supreme Court 9 held that there is no constitutional requirement that a trial judge determine that a contested confession is voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before it can be admitted
into evidence. Using a lesser standard is not a violation of the due
process requirement that a criminal defendant must be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt as to all the elements necessary to consti3. People v. Lego, 32 Ill. 2d 76, 203 N.E.2d 875 (1965). On his appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court, Lego did not raise the issue that his confession would have
to be proved voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before it could be admitted at trial.
Among other issues, he attacked the voluntariness question on its merits. That court
held that ". . . the question of the voluntary character of a confession is for the trial
court to determine and unless it can be said that the decision of the trial court is
manifestly against the weight of the evidence, the decision of the trial court will not
be disturbed. People v. Weger, 28 Ill.
2d 370; People v. Miller, 13 Ill. 2d 84; People v.
Townsend, 11 Il1. 2d 30." 32 Ill.
2d at 79.
4. Illinois law states that a confession may be admitted as voluntary if, after a
full hearing out of the presence of the jury, the trial judge finds the confession voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Sammons, 17 Ill. 2d 316,
161 N.E.2d 322 (1959); People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill. 2d 188, 133 N.E.2d 24 (1956).
5. Illinois follows the so-called "orthodox" procedure where the voluntariness of
the confession is determined solely by the judge and is not resubmitted to the jury.
People v. Thomlinson, 400 Ill. 555, 91 N.E.2d 434 (1948); People v. Jackson, 41
I11.2d 102, 242 N.E.2d 160 (1968); ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 38 § 114-11 (1964).
Other states follow the Massachusetts procedure where if at a hearing the trial judge
finds a confession to be voluntary it is admitted into evidence, but the jury is also
asked to determine the issue and is instructed to disregard a confession it finds to
have been involuntarily given.
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 338 Mass. 460,
155 N.E.2d 798 (1959); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 (1964). Appendix A,
filed by Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent to Jackson, contains a state by state compilation of which method is employed.
6. U.S. ex rel Lego v. Pate, 308 F. Supp. 38 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
7. The Seventh Circuit's ffirmance is unreported. Lego v. Pate No. 18313 (7th
Cir. Oct. 8, 1970).
8. 401 U.S. 992 (1971).
.9. 404 U.S. 477 (1972). The Court's opinion was delivered by Justice White in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackman joined. Justice
Brennen filed a dissent joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist took no part in considering the case.
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tute a crime. The Court also held that there was insufficient reason
shown for expanding current exclusionary rules to require a higher
standard for admissibility of confessions than any other evidentiary
material. Finally, the Court denied Lego's argument that his right to
trial by jury was violated when the issue of voluntariness was not also
submitted to the jury. It reaffirmed the traditional doctrine that admissibility of evidence is a question for the court rather than the jury.
Lego v. Twomey is concerned exclusively with the standards for admissibility of confessions; it neither adds to nor detracts from the conceptual definition of voluntariness which has been the focus of past decisions. In the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi0 the United States
Supreme Court for the first time reversed a state conviction based on
the use of an extorted confession. The rationale for the decision was
that confessions that were obtained as a result of physical abuse by the
police were likely to be untrustworthy. The major concern was for
protecting the innocent person who might have been coerced into confessing something for which he was not guilty.
As the Court heard more and more appeals from state convictions
based on allegedly involuntary confessions, the inherent unreliability of
the statements as a reason for reversal took on a lesser degree of importance. The Court began ordering the exclusion of coerced confession as a method for controlling police conduct without regard to
whether they were true or false. Speaking for the majority in Spano v.
New York," Chief Justice Warren explained this change in emphasis:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also
turns on the deep rooted feeling that the police must obey the law
while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as
much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.' 2
This shift in emphasis has now been completed so that today it is
reversible error to accept any evidence at all as to the truth or falsity
of the statements at a voluntariness hearing. The focus at the hearing
should be on whether the State's law enforcement officials acted in
such a way as to overcome petitioner's will to resist, and truthfulness
" . . . is not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of
the fourteenth amendment." 3 The concern now is not only with pro10. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
11. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
12. Id. at 320-21.

13.

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961).
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tecting the innocent against the possibility of false confessions, but also
with protecting even the guilty against the use of illegal methods in ob14
taining the confession.
In the 1964 case of Jackson v. Denno,'5 the Court held that a criminal defendant who challenges the voluntariness of a confession sought
to be used against him at trial has a due process right to a". . . reliable
and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession .. ."16 In Jackson, the Court struck down the New York procedure for determining voluntariness as being inadequate and a denial
of due process. Prior to Jackson, New York and several other states
used a procedure whereby the judge would exclude a confession only
if it could not under any circumstances be found voluntary. Normally
the issue was submitted to a jury which was instructed to pass first upon the voluntariness question and, if involuntary, to exclude the confession when determining guilt or innocence. If, however, they found
the confession to have been voluntarily given, they were to give it
whatever weight they thought it deserved in judging the defendant's
7
guilt.'
The Court found this system failed to meet due process standards
because it was impossible to determine how the jury resolved the question of voluntariness whenever a conviction was returned. There was
no way of determining whether the jury accepted the confession as voluntary and found the defendant guilty on that basis or if they found
the confession involuntary and convicted on other evidence. There
was never any clear-cut determination of whether the confession was
found to be voluntary or not. The Jackson Court also felt that it was
too much to ask of a jury to ignore a coerced confession if other evidence indicated that the confession was probably true.
It is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole
or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the
truth or falsity of the confession . . . and even though there is
ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction. . . . Equally clear is the defendant's constitutional right at
14. See, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confessions in the United States
Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35 (1962).

15.

378 U.S. 368 (1964).

16.

Id. at 391.

17. Jackson v. Denno includes a thorough description of the New York procedure,
378 U.S. at 377-391. For a pre-Jackson description of the three methods used in determining the voluntariness of a confession (the New York procedure; the Orthodox
procedure: the Massachusetts procedure), see Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The
Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 (1954).
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some stage in the proceeding to object to the use of the confession
and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or
falsity of the confession. 18
Despite a prodding dissent by Mr. Justice Black, 19 the majority in
Jackson gave no indication of any standard that must be met in order
to prove the confession voluntary.2 0 Thus, left without direction, the
state and federal courts that have decided on the quantum of proof
have adopted a variety of standards. Those courts which have discussed their reasons for adopting the beyond a reasonable doubt standard have generally stated that they consider the higher standard necessary because of the tremendous impact a confession is likely to have.
They have equated the admissibility of a confession with a finding of
guilt.2 ' The courts that have adopted a lesser standard have often
held that beyond a reasonable doubt is not the applicable standard for
admissibility; it is relevent only in the determination of guilt or innocence. 2 Several courts have not stated a burden of proof which must
18. 378 U.S. at 376-377 (citations omitted).
19. "The Court has not said that its new constitutional rule, which requires the
judge to decide voluntariness, also imposes on the State the burden of proving this
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Does the Court's new ruling allow the judge to decide voluntariness merely on a preponderance of the evidence? If so, this is a distinct
disadvantage to the defendant." 378 U.S. at 405 (dissenting opinion).
20. In most American jurisdictions, once the voluntariness of a confession has been
contested by a defendant, the prosecution has the burden of proof that it was not
coerced.

3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 860 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).

21. Eleven states and two federal Circuit courts have specifically adopted the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The cases are: United States v. Inman, 352
F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965); Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
State v. Ragsdale, 249 La. 420, 187 So. 2d 427 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029
(1967); State v. Keiser, 274 Minn. 265, 272, 143 N.W.2d 75, 80 (1966) ("Because of
the persuasive character of a confession as evidence, it would only seem fair to say
that on the issue of voluntariness a mere prima facie showing or a preponderance of
the evidence should not satisfy the court . . . the evidence of voluntariness should be
of such persuasive force as to satisfy the court to a moral certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt."); Lee v. State, 236 Miss. 716, 112 So. 2d 254 (1959); State v. Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 139 N.W.2d 66 (1965); State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 231 A.2d
598 (1965) (because reasonable doubt standard likely to be federally imposed, trial
judges advised to begin using it); People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179
(1965); State ex. rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965),
ccrt. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966); State v. Thundershield, 83 S.D. 414, 160 N.W.2d
408 (1968); Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. 1964); Commonwealth v.
Mayhew, 297 Ky. 172, 178 S.W.2d 928 (1943) (any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the defendant); People v. Stroud, 273 Cal. App. 670, 78 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1969).
22. Fifteen states have specifically adopted a standard of less than beyond a reasonable doubt. The cases are: People v. Harper, 36 IlL. 2d 398, 223 N.E.2d 841 (1967)
(preponderance); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d
426 (1968) (same); Ballew v. State, 429 S.W.2d 577 (Ark. 1970) (same); Monts v.
State, 218 Tenn. 31, 400 S.W.2d 722 (1966) (same); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698,
471 P.2d 553 (1970) (same); State v. Davis, 73 Wash. 2d 271, 438 P.2d 185 (1968)
(same); Gardner v. State, 10 Md. App. 233, 269 A.2d 186 (1970) (prima facie proof);
Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So. 2d 840 (1965) (same); State v. Nolan, 423
S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1968) (same); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232
N.E.2d 335 (1967) (to satisfaction of the court); State v. White, 146 Mont. 226,
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be met at a voluntariness hearing.2 3
In Lego, the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, confronted this issue head-on. The Court answered two arguments in
holding that there is no constitutional requirement that a confession be
found voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. The first contention was
that using a less strict standard deprives a defendant of due process
and violates the Court's decision of In Re Winship. 24 The second argument was that by insisting on the highest standard of proof to show
that a confession was voluntary, the courts would offer concrete protection to the important values which the exclusionary rule was formulated to serve. For this argument Lego tried to show that confessions,
because of their powerful effect on the jury, have a special nature
which requires the application of the higher standard.
Lego's major argument was that if a trial court judge may admit a
confession as voluntary by less than beyond a reasonable doubt, the result is likely to be that a criminal defendant might be found guilty by
less than beyond a reasonable doubt. The introduction of a confession
at trial is going to have an overwhelming effect on a jury. Once a confession is admitted, any doubts the jury might have concerning guilt are
almost certain to disappear; having heard a confession, a jury will be
almost certain to be predisposed to convict. The decision that a confession was voluntarily given and is admissible is almost tantamount to
a decision that the defendant is guilty. The judge's determination of
voluntariness by a mere preponderance2 5 of this evidence will rapidly
405 P.2d 761 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966) (same); State v. Brewton,
238 Ore. 590, 395 P.2d 874 (1964) (same; dissent arguing for beyond a reasonable
doubt); State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) (to satisfaction of the
court); State v. Pulliam, 87 Ariz. 216, 349 P.2d 781 (1960) (same); State v. Milow,
199 Kan. 576, 433 P.2d 538 (1967) (by the same standards that govern other preliminary matters).
23. Six federal Circuit courts and five states have not stated a burden of proof
which must be met at a voluntariness hearing. The cases are: United States v.
Feinberg, 383 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir. 1967) (cited cases which have used the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard); Fisher v. United States, 382 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1967);
Monts v. Henderson, 409 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d
753 (7th Cir. 1967); Wakaksan v. United States, 367 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1966);
Moser v. United States, 381 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1967) (enough evidence from which
the jury might determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the confessions were voluntarily given); Brooks v. State, 229 A.2d 833 (Del. 1967) (question brought up but
not decided); People v. Pallister, 14 Mich. App. 139, 165 N.W.2d 319 (1968) (same);
Dodel v. State, 232 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1970); Smith v. State, 249 N.E.2d 493 (Ind.
1969); State v. Clybourn, 273 N.C. 284, 159 S.E.2d 868 (1968).
24. 397 U.S. 358 (1970), in which the Supreme Court specifically held that the
beyond the reasonable doubt standard was an essential element for all criminal convictions.
25. The Lego Court sanctioned the preponderance rule. "...
when a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal defendant at
his trial, he is entitled to a reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession
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melt into a jury's determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Allowing a confession to be admitted which has been deemed voluntary
by only a preponderance of the evidence is, in effect, allowing the defendant to be found guilty by only a preponderance of the evidence.
This potential result, the argument concludes, would violate the mandate of In Re Winship26 in which the Court held that all criminal defendants have a due process right to the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard in a determination of guilt or innocence.
The Court answered this argument by analyzing the purpose for
which a voluntariness hearing is held.2" Such a hearing, the Court
stated, has nothing to do with enhancing the reliability of jury verdicts
nor is it aimed at reducing the possibility of convicting innocent men.
The sole purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the confession
was in any way coerced. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, as
required by Winship, is applicable only in the determination of guilt or
innocence. The purpose of the higher standard is to ensure against
unjust convictions and to give concrete effect to the presumption of innocence; it is the standard to be used by the jury; it has nothing to do
with judicial standards for admissibility of evidence. Thus, confessions
are not excluded because of any possible unreliability. The judge alone
determines admissibility; the jury determines reliability. It is possible
that even an involuntary confession may be persuasive enough to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. By this analysis the Court held that
the use of the preponderance rule for determining voluntariness is not
a violation of Winship.2
If one can accept the Court's premise that the voluntariness of a confession is essentially an evidentiary matter and the normal standards of
admissibility are also applicable to confessions, it would be difficult to
fault the Lego decision. There are, however, some major philosophical considerations which transcend the purely mechanical test which the
was in fact voluntarily rendered. Thus, the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary." 404 U.S. 477, 489

(1972).
26. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a): "In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence
if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness.
If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntary it shall be admitted in
evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant testimony on the
issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession
as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances."
28. The opposing arguments over whether the reasonable doubt standard should be
required at voluntariness hearings are well set out and discussed in Clifton v. United
States, 371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995 (1967).
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Court used. Although it is probably true that "there is only a relatively narrow zone of cases in which a judge in a criminal matter will be
satisfied of voluntariness though he harbors a reasonable doubt",29 it is
within that "narrow zone" where the standard of proof becomes vital.
At a voluntariness hearing there will almost always be conflicting testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession
and when the conclusion of the factfinder is controlled by which of two
conflicting accounts is accepted, it is clear that the standard of persuasion will be determinative. 30
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the
Constitution requires that no one should be convicted based on a confession unless that confession was freely and voluntarily given and, to the
greatest extent possible, coerced confessions should be eliminated without regard to their truth or falsity.3 1 A basic question then arises:
Does admitting confessions, which have been shown to be voluntary
by a preponderance of the evidence adequately protect against the use
of involuntary confessions at criminal trials? The Lego majority
pointedly failed to answer or even discuss this question. It preferred
to base its decision on a mechanical distinction between the functions
of the judge and those of the jury. While the Court did discuss the
use of the high standard of proof in Winship to give substance to the
presumption of innocence,3 2 it also insisted that a high standard of
proof at a voluntariness hearing has nothing to do with ensuring
against unjust convictions. "A guilty verdict is not rendered less reliable . . . simply because the admissibility of a confession is deter'33
mined by a less stringent standard.
Accepting the Court's reasoning concerning the distinct functions of
the judge and of the jury, the fact still remains, as pointed out by the
dissent, that
• . .given the factual nature of the ordinary voluntairness determination, . . . permitting a lower standard of proof will necessarily result in the admission of more involuntary confessions than
would be admitted were the prosecution required to meet a higher
standard. The converse, of course, is also true. Requiring the
higher standard means that some voluntary confessions win be ex29.
30.
31.
(1964);
(1964).

Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d at 364 (concurring opinion).
See 404 U.S. 492 (Justice Brennen dissenting).
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368

32.

404 U.S. at 486-87.

33.

Id. at 487.
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cluded as involuntary even though 4 they would have been found
voluntary under the lower standard.
A similar argument was used in Winship concerning the prosecution's standard for proving the defendant guilty of the actual crime. 5
Using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard will necessarily mean
that fewer innocent defendants will be convicted but it also means that
more guilty persons will be freed. Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion justified this result by stating: "In a criminal case . . . we do
not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivaHe conlent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty."3
cluded that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
"bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free."3 7
Arguing by analogy to Mr. Justice Harlan's views in Winship, does
it then follow that the Lego majority feels that it is no worse to admit
an involuntary confession than it is to exclude a voluntary one? An
affirmative answer to that question would seem to follow from the
Court's statement that ".

.

. from our experience . . . no substantial

evidence has accumulated that federal rights have suffered from deter'3 8
mining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.
This raises Lego's second major argument: the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self incrimination is an "essential mainstay' 3 9 of our system of criminal justice and, as such, the utmost protection should be afforded a criminal defendant to ensure that no involuntary confessions or statements will be used against him. The only
truely adequate way to protect this essential mainstay, Lego contends,
is to require proof of voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court admitted that this argument "is straightforward and has appeal."40

Yet the Court refused to accept it because it was " . . . un-

convinced that merely emphasizing the importance of the values served
by exclusionary rules is itself sufficient demonstration that the Constitution also requires admissibility to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."'"
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 493 (dissenting opinion).
397 U.S. at 371-372 (concurring opinion of Justice Harlan).
Id. at 372.
Id.
404 U.S. at 488.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
404 U.S. at 488.
Id.
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A prime element in Lego's argument is that a confession, because
of its very potent effect upon a jury, is a unique piece of evidence and
therefore requires a unique standard for admissibility. There is, of
course, no question that a confession can be of such overwhelming
evidentiary value that its admission is likely to have such a persuasive
effect upon a jury as to substantially determine the outcome of the
trial. As was stated by Judge Levanthal in his concurring opinion in
Clifton v. United States:42
The determination by a judge of the voluntariness of a confession
is so significant in the final assessment of guilt or innocence, and
relates to such basic values in our system of jurisprudence, that
it must be governed by the same standards as apply to the elements of a crime, and it is not to be relegated to a lower
plane on
43
the ground that it is a mere ruling on a point of evidence.
This argument that a confession, because of its effect on a jury, is
thereby unique loses much of its force when compared with other
pieces of evidence and their potential impact on a jury. The testimony
of an eye-witness, for example, is likely to be as damaging as a confession. The same might be said for the testimony of an undercover
agent, or tapes of an accused's conversations, or the defendant's fingerprints found on a murder weapon. The introduction of any of these
evidentiary materials is likely to carry an overpowering weight with
the jury. In United States v. Schipani," in which the court argued
that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard should be imposed at all
suppression hearings, the trial judge also commented on the persuasive
value of confessions as compared to other pieces of evidence:
Any evidence which is illegally obtained may be damning, so that
the decision cannot turn on the importance of a confession in a
case. Frequently, having lost on a motion to suppress, the defendant's chance of avoiding conviction is hopeless. A 'confession'
may contain exculpatory material, be incomplete, or be unreliable
so that it is no more the equivalent of a plea of guilty than is key
evidence illegally obtained. Certainly the burden of proof at a
preliminary hearing should not depend on how critical the evidence sought to be suppressed may be at the trial . . . . There is
some possibility that the jury will discount a confession which is
in fact not voluntary but almost none that it will ignore evidence
4
obtained by illegal electronic surveillance, wiretaps or searches. 5
42.

371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (concurring opinion).

43.

Id. at 361-362.

For a similar argument in favor of the reasonable doubt stand-

ard because of the "dual character" of a confession-as a piece of evidence and also
as the equivalence of guilt, see The Reasonable Doubt Standard in Preliminary Proceedings to Determine the Voluntariness of a Confession, 42 TEMPLE L.Q. 60 (1968).
44. 289 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).

45.

Id. at 58.
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Because it is virtually impossible, other than by "common sense" arguments, to accurately weigh the impact any one piece of evidence is
likely to have on a jury, it is also almost impossible to show that confessions are inherently different and more damaging than other pieces
of evidence. Lacking such proof, a court facing the issue in the Lego
case would have two widely divergent choices available. It could hold,
as did the Schipani court, that whenever a criminal defendant moves
to have any piece of evidence suppressed as having been illegally obtained, the prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the evidence was not in any way tainted. It would be very difficult to justify imposing the higher standard for admissibility for one
piece of evidence-such as whether a confession was voluntarily given
-and then require a different, lesser standard for others-such as
whether a photographic identification was suggestive.
Taking this first choice and imposing the beyond a reasonable doubt
requirement in all suppression hearings would constitute a broad expansion of the exclusionary rules and would impose significantly more
difficult burdens on the prosecution. Perhaps this is the real reason
why those courts which have argued that beyond a reasonable doubt is
not the "normal" standard for admissibility have refused to apply that
standard at voluntariness hearings.
The second choice, the one adopted in Lego, is simply to deny that
the important values which the exclusionary rule was designed to protect would be in any way enhanced by requiring admissibility to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lego Court concluded:
Without good cause, we are unwilling to expand currently applicable exclusionary rules by erecting additional barriers to placing
truthful and probative evidence before state juries and by revising
the standards applicable to state collateral proceedings. Sound
reason for moving further in this direction has not been offered
nor do we discern any at the present time. This is particularly
true since the exclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring
lawless conduct by police and prosecution and it is very doubtful
that escalating the prosecution's burden of proof in fourth and
fifth amendment suppression hearings would be sufficiently productive in this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing
probative evidence before juries for the4 6purpose of arriving at
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.
Given the Court's sanction of the preponderance rule, it would be
worthwhile to examine what is meant by "preponderance of the evi46.

404 U.S. at 488-89.
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dence." Professor James has defined this standard as simply requiring
the trier of fact "to believe the existence of a fact is more probable
than its non-existence. . . . "I Using that standard in a voluntariness
hearing would merely require the trial judge to find that it was more
probable that a confession was voluntary than not. However, an analysis of the cases which have adopted the preponderance rule indicates
that the courts appear to be demanding something more than just the
weight of probabilities. In People v. Thomlinson,4s which was cited
by the Lego majority as authority for the preponderance rule in Illinois,
the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
The mere denial of the officers of the illegal methods employed
are not considered conclusive of the voluntary character of the
The courts should scrutinize with the utmost
confession. . .
care facts concerning the alleged voluntary confession to police
officers and not deem itself bound by their testimony alone, without taking into consideration all of the circumstances surrounding
it. 49
The Eighth Circuit, in Wakaksan v. United States,50 although not holding the prosecution to any specific standard of proof, ruled that in determining voluntariness " . . . close scrutiny to the facts of each individual case is the necessary approach and the totality of the circumstances dictates the decision."'" The United States Supreme Court has
also indicated that it would demand a high level of reliability for a determination of voluntariness; a level that would appear more demanding than "more probable than not." In Jackson v. Denno,5 2 the principal case relied on by the Lego Court in affirming the preponderance
rule, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulties inherent in the suppression hearing when it stated: "The overall determination of the voluntariness of a confession has become an exceedingly sensitive task.
S. ."- Later in the same decision, the Court, in commenting on the
methods to be used, further stated: "These procedures must, therefore, be fully adequate to ensure a reliable and clearcut determination
'54
of the voluntariness of the confession.
In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

5

the United States Su-

JAMES, CiVIL PRocEDuRE 250-252 (1965).

400 Ill.555, 81 N.E.2d 434 (1948).
400 Ill.at 560, 81 N.E. at 440 (emphasis added).
367 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 994 (1967).
Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
Id. at 391.
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preme Court stated: "If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on
the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination." 56
Given these views which the various courts have expressed concerning the burdens to be met at a voluntariness hearing, it is perhaps justified in concluding that the courts have been, in effect, demanding
proof beyond a reasonable doubt without ever really saying soYT

If

this is true, there must be some justification for formally denying the
applicability of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to questions
of admissibility of confessions.
The argument most commonly presented for refusing to apply the
higher standard has been that ruling on admissibility of evidence is a
function of the trial judge and, therefore, imposition of the reasonable
doubt standard would be an exception to the court's normal procedure
in the admission of evidence."' In Clifton v. United States,5 9 the court
stated the argument:
It is one thing to call for this high standard of proof from the ultimate fact-finder and quite another to ask that this issue be resolved preliminarily by the judge beyond a reasonable doubt contrary to all the law governing the admissibility of evidence ....
We are not persuaded that it is more logical or reasonable that a
confession, alone among all the myriad of evidentiary material,
be singled out for a unique standard of appraisal. 60
When Clifton was later overruled by Pea v. United States,6' in which
the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the reasonable doubt standard, the dissent commented that: "It is indeed a remarkable anomoly
in the law that a trial judge, in passing on the admissibility of a piece
of evidence, do so by any particular quantitative standard. '6 2 The
Lego majority also apparently felt that there was no legal justification
for imposing any quantitative standard of proof for judging the admis63
sibility of confessions.
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
57. Some of these same comments have been used in determining that beyond a
reasonable doubt is the better standard; See, e.g., State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 231 A.2d

598 (1965).
58. United States ex. rel. I-ego v. Pate, 308 F. Supp. 38, 40 (N.D. Inl. 1970).
59. 371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995 (1967).
60. Id. at 358.
61. 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
62. Id. at 639 (dissenting opinion).
63. The Court stated:
We did not think it necessary or even appropriate in Jackson to announce that
prosecutors would be required to meet a particular burden of proof in a
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To paraphrase the Pea dissent, "it is indeed an anomoly" if, as these
courts insist, a confession is to be treated as any other piece of evidence and then to have these same courts give their approval to a
standard for admissibility which is not applied to all other pieces of
evidence. For proof by a preponderance of the evidence is no more
the "normal" standard by which admissibility of evidence is to be determined than is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 64 Preponderance
is also a quantitative standard.
In non-confession suppression hearings based on an application of
the exclusionary rule, the courts have not been as reluctant to impose
burdens of proof that the evidence was not obtained in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights. In United States v. Jordan,65 the
court stated that the government has a "heavy burden" in proving voluntary consent to search.8 6 The Eighth Circuit, in Evans v. United
States,6" commented that "the district court was required to make a
finding on the record with 'unmistakable clarity' that (1) the Miranda
warnings were given; (2) the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination."6' 8 Several other courts
have also imposed a certain burden of proof at suppression hearings.6 9
All of these cases indicate that where potential violation of important
constitutional rights are involved, the courts will not hesitate to impose
high quantitative standards for admissibility despite the argument that
a sufficiency test cannot be applied to questions of admissibility."7
That argument can be characterized as essentially a demand
for form over substance.
Jackson hearing held before the trial judge. Indeed, the then-established
duty to determine voluntariness had not been framed in terms of a burden of
proof, nor has it been since Jackson was decided. 404 U.S. at 484.
64. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 26 (1954). The concurring opinion in Clifton states
that the standard of proof that governs finding of fact in ordinary rulings on evidence
is "to the satisfaction of the court."
65. 399 F.2d 610 (2nd Cir. 1968).
66. Id. at 614.

67.

375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967).

68.

Id. at 360.

69.

United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (beyond a reason-

able doubt should be the standard imposed at all suppression hearings where the evidence is attacked as having been illegally procured); United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d
657, 666 .(2d Cir. 1962) (consent to search must be proved by "clear and positive evidence"); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962) (consent to
search must be proved by. "clear and positive testimony"); United States v. Taglianetti, 274 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D.R.I. 1967) (legality of electronic surveillance must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Gillison v. United States, 399 F.2d 586, 588

(D.C. Cir. 1968) (state must show that line of questioning was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt).

70.

United States ex. rel. Lego v. Pate, 308 F. Supp. 38, 40 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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The imposition of these high standards of proof before certain pieces of
evidence will be admitted at trial reflects a judicial determination that
select constitutional guarantees will be protected even if it means going
beyond the "normal" rules for admitting evidence. The Lego Court,
by adopting the preponderance rule, is apparently treating as identical
the objectives of the fourth and fifth amendments' exclusionary rule.
By failing to discuss any possible difference they are implicitly rejecting
the worth of any such an argument. However, by accepting the quantitive standard of preponderance for the voluntariness of confessions
they are, in effect, applying different standards.
Whether this decision is an indication of a reluctance on the part of
the Court to expand the exclusionary rules is problamatic. What is
clear, however, is that the Court is going to demand firm proof that an
expansion is warranted. Simply putting the criminal defendant in a
more advantageous position is not sufficient justification for such an
expansion.
Other more practical problems remain when a trial judge is allowed
to admit confessions as voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.
One of these problems is the effect such leeway will have on the judge,
himself. Another is the difficult stategic position in which a defendant
is placed after a determination that his statements have been voluntarily given.
When a judge hears evidence at a suppression hearing concerning the
circumstances in which a confession was given, he is expected to make
his decision on admissibility without any regard to the truth or falsity
of that confession. 7 As a practical matter, however, evidence as to
the authenticity of the statements made is very likely to come out at
the hearing. If evidence that the confession is truthful is offered, the
judge is put in a very awkward position. He is expected to ignore the
probable credibility of the statements and make his decision based
solely on whether he has been convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that the confession was voluntary. The Lego Court recognized this problem by stating: "As difficult as such tasks may be to accomplish, the judge is also duty-bound to ignore implications of reliability in facts relevant to coercion. . ."'
".
When facts concerning
the truthfulness of the confession do come out, the judge is put in the
same position which the Jackson Court found unacceptable for jurors.
71.
72.

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1965).
404 U.S. at 485, n.12.
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In commenting on the rationale for Jackson, the Lego Court said:
".. . we feared that the reliability and truthfulness of even a coerced
confession could impermissibly influence a jury's determination as to
73
voluntariness."
At least one authority has expressed those same fears concerning
judges' ability to keep the two issues of voluntariness and credibility
separate. Professor McCormick, in his text on Evidence, voiced the
opinion that judges as well as juries would have a tendency to find the
confession voluntary because they "will often be more interested in
punishing the crime with which the prisoner is charged than in protecting the civil rights of a probably guilty man by disregarding the
extorted confession. 7' 4 Despite the harshness of that opinion, it should
be fairly clear that under the preponderance rule the trial judge will
admit confessions even when he has some doubts as to their voluntariness. This tendency can only be increased when the judge has also
heard testimony which supports the reliability of the statements.
After a determination by the trial judge that a confession is voluntary and admissible, a defendant is still allowed to argue to the jury
that it was, in fact, coerced and, therefore, unreliable. The defendant
can re-present all the evidence surrounding the taking of the confession
which he had offered at the suppression hearing. He can also attack
the credibility of his statements. Theoretically, the jury is free to give
the confession whatever weight they think it deserves and even to reject it entirely as unworthy of belief. In most cases, however, in order
to present his evidence to the jury, the defendant, himself, is required
to testify to his version of the events surrounding the confession. By
doing so, however, he runs the risk of impeachment on cross examination. Yet the necessity of making this hard choice cannot be said to
75
put the defendant in a constitutionally unfair position.
Even if a defendant does testify, and the jury hears evidence of the
circumstances attendant to the giving of the confession, and even if the
jury concludes that the confession was, in fact, coerced, how feasible is
it that they will disregard it when determining guilt or innocence? It
is the unlikely juror, who after hearing that the defendant has already
confessed to the crime, will be able to suspend belief in the confession
merely because evidence is introduced to show coercion. These men73.

Id. at 485.

74.
75.

MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
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§ 112 (1954).

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
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tal gymnastics which a juror would be asked to perform would be compounded under the Massachusetts procedure in which the jury is instructed that they must first find the confession voluntary; if they find
it involuntary they are not to use it regardless of its believability. This
is essentially the same situtaion with which the Supreme Court found
fault in Jackson."6
Lego specifically approved the procedure used in Illinois where the
voluntariness of the confession is determined solely by the trial judge."M
In denying Lego's contention that he has a right to have the issue of
voluntariness re-submitted to the jury, the Court said: "We are not
disposed to impose as a constitutional requirement a procedure we have
found wanting merely to afford petitioner a second forum for litigating
his claim."7 8
It is doubtful, however, whether a great many criminal defendants
would be willing to testify at the trial at all. It is likely that most will be
reluctant to do so because of the fear of possible impeachment on
cross-examination. As a practical matter, therefore, evidence concerning the alleged coercion will seldom reach the jury; the trial judge's
determination will, more often than not, be the last word on the subject. If the evidence of coercion is going to be heard only by the judge,
is it not then " . . . unjust if such evidence raised a reasonable doubt
only to find that this doubt was ignored by the judge . . . and was
79
never available to the jury?
CONCLUSION

The criminal defense bar can take little encouragement from the Lego
decision. Allowing the judge to determine voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence will be a distinct disadvantage to certain criminal defendants. Because the gap between preponderance and beyond
a reasonable doubt is measured differently by different judges, it would
be very hard to predict how many defendants will be actually affected
by this decision. Certainly it would have made no difference to Lego's
trial judge; there was no doubt in his mind that the confession was voluntary. But still it is probably fair to assume that, except in those
76.

Supra, note 5.

77.

"We also reject petitioner's final contention that, even though the trial judge

ruled on his coercion claim, he was entitled to have the jury decide the claim anew."
404 U.S. at 489.
78. 404 U.S. at 490.

79. Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
opinion).

(concurring
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states which have already adopted the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for admissibility,"' more confessions will be admitted as voluntary than were previously. Because of Lego, the trial judge will
have less fear of being reversed when he admits a defendant's statements into evidence.
Despite the many difficulties the criminal defendant might face by
having his statements deemed voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence, it is evident that the Court is unwilling to erect additional constitutional roadblocks simply to ease his situation. A contrary decision
would have imposed added barriers to the prosecution's burden of
proof. It would have expanded the exclusionary rule and have generated a great deal of pressure for further expansion. All this would
have happened without any concrete showing that, as a result, our
system of criminal jurisprudence would be in any way improved. Given all of these factors, one can only conclude that the Lego decision
was right and proper.
GERALD

F.

MURRAY

80. Supra, note 21. It will be of interest to note what effect the Lego decision
will have on those states that have accepted the higher standard. They are free to
retain it if they wish but it is likely that Lego will generate pressure for a revision
downward.
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